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Article 2

Reflections on Section 382: Searching for a
Rationale

J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. *
Under federal income tax law, certain corporate acquisitions
will preserve an unprofitable corporation's net operating loss
(NOL) carryover. Where the acquisition occurs via an integrated
taxable transaction, preservation is the general rule if the transaction was (1) an acquisition of stock with the loss corporation
remaining in existence or (2) an acquisition of assets by the loss
corporation. Where the acquisition is through a nontaxable transaction, preservation generally occurs if the deal was covered by
section 381(a)l or if the loss corporation remained in e ~ i s t e n c e . ~
This list of "preservation" transactions seems to reflect a stable
consensus as to the types of business acquisitions which should
permit survival of a corporate NOL carryover; there appears little
pressure for change.
But even if a corporate acquisition occurs through a transaction permitting survival of the loss corporation's NOL carry* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Member of the Utah and Washington Bars.
1. I.R.C. 9 381(a) provides:
RULE.-In the case of the acquisition of assets of a corporation
(a) GENERAL
by another corporation(1) in a distribution to such other corporation to which section
332 -(relatingto liquidations of subsidiaries) applies, except in a case
in which the basis of the assets distributed is determined under seetion 334(b)(2); or
(2) in a transfer to which section 361 (relating to nonrecognition
of gain or loss to corporations) applies, but only if the transfer is in
connection with a reorganization described in subparagraph (A), (C),
(D) (but only if the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
section 354(b)(1) are met), or (F) of section 368(a)(1),
the acquiring corporation shall succeed to and take into account, as of the close
of the day of distribution or transfer, the items described in subsection (c) of
the distributor or transferor corporation, subject to the conditions and limitations specified in subsections (b) and (c).
The "items described in subsection (c)" include NOL carryovers.
2. For a more detailed summary of transactions which both do and do not permit
& J. Eusnc~,FEDERAL
INCOME
preservation of corporate NOL carryovers, see B. BIT~KER
TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS
7 16.03 (4th ed. 1979).
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over as the general rule, can there nevertheless be circumstances
justifying restrictions on the survival of the carryover in a particular case? If so, what are the circumstances and what restrictions
are justified? There is no settled agreement on these issues.
This lack of consensus is due largely to the absence of a
clearly identified governing principle or rationale for use in resolving the issues. For instance, settled answers are lacking for
several central questions. Is a corporate NOL carryover an asset
which the owners should be allowed to realize on? If so, who are
the owners-the shareholders at the time the loss was sustained,
shareholders who have newly acquired control, or the corporation
itself? Is a corporate NOL carryover an income averaging device
limited to the corporation suffering loss and inherently incapable
of surviving an asset transfer to another corporation? Should a
corporate NOL carryover follow the business assets that created
it? What effect should a change of business or change in shareIt is clear from these
holders have on a corporate NOL ~arryover?~
unanswered questions that until basic principles are established
for determining the extent to which corporate NOL carryovers
should survive in particular preservation transactions, our tax
law cannot be structured to deal adequately with this matter.
Although lacking these basic principles, Congress nevertheless proceeded to. impose detailed and complicated rules in this
area by the 1954 enactment of section 382.4 These rules were
3. See generally AMERICAN
LAWINSTITUTE,
FEDERAL
INCOME,ESTATEAND G I TAX
~
OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS
341-48
PROJECT-FEDERAL
INCOME
TAXPROBLEMS
(1958) [hereinafter cited as ALI PROJECT].
4. The pre-1976 Tax Reform Act version of 4 382 (Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch.
736, 8 382,68A Stat. 3) was principally divided into 4 382(a), dealing with taxable changes
in corporate ownership and 4 382(b), dealing with tax-free corporate acquisitions.
[Section 382(a)] provided that where new owners buy 50 percent or more of the
stock of a loss corporation during a 2-year period, its loss carryovers from prior
years were allowed in full if the company continued to conduct its prior trade
or business or substantially the same kind of business. It could add or begin a
new business, however, and apply loss carryovers incurred by the former owners
against profits from the new business (unless tax avoidance was the principal
purpose for the acquisition). If the same business was not continued, however,
loss carryovers were completely lost. In the case of a tax-free reorganization, loss
carryovers were allowed on a declining scale (sec. 382(b)). If the former owners
of the loss company received 20 percent or more of the fair market value of the
stock of the acquiring company, the loss carryovers were allowed in full. For each
percentage point less than 20 which the former owners received, the loss carryover was reduced by 5 percentage points. It was immaterial whether the business
of the loss company was continued after the reorganization (sec. 382(b)).
ON TAXATION,
9 4 CONG.,
~ ~ 2D SESS.,GENERAL
EXPLANATION
OF
STAFFOF JOINTCOMMITTEE
THE TAXREFORM
ACTOF 1976, a t 190 (Comm. Print 1976). It was stated with respect to
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significantly amended in 1976 with a quantum increase in comp l e ~ i t y ,but
~ the effective date has been delayed until 1980 to
permit further study.6
Since the degree of survival of corporate NOL carryovers in
connection with preservation transactions is a current and open
question, this Article will investigate the rationale that should be
used in resolving the issue. The investigation will be facilitated
by a brief look at history and economics.

In 1909 Congress levied, without apportionment among the
states, a one percent tax on corporate annual net incomes exceeding $5000. Perhaps because 1909 fell between the unfortunate
Pollock decision,' which declared the unapportioned 1894 income
tax unconstitutional, and the adoption of the sixteenth amendment, Congress did not openly call the new exaction an income
tax. Instead, it was styled a "special excise tax with respect to the
carrying on or doing busine~s."~
Presumably, this terminology
was used because excises had earlier been classified indirect taxes
that were exempt from the Constitution's apportionment requirement?
Confident that this congressional camouflage would be disregarded and that the new levy would be declared an invalid income tax under Pollock for lack of apportionment, taxpayers
went to court. The result was Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,1° which
held that the tax was "an excise upon the particular privilege of
doing business in a corporate capacity" and that no apportionment was required."
pre-1976 § 382 that "the basic criticism of the present Code provisions regulating transferability of loss carryovers is directed to the lack of a uniform underlying principle upon
supra note 3, at 341.
which to construct effective statutory provisions." ALI PROJECT,
5. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806 (e), 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at
I.R.C. 4 382, applicable to tax years beginning after June 30, 1980). For a thorough
discussion of the new rules, see Eustice, The Tax Reform Act of 1976: Loss Carryovers
and Other Corporate Changes, 32 TAXL. REV.113 (1977).
6. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 368, 92 Stat. 2763. See STAFFOF
JOINTCOMM.
ON TAXATION,
9 5 CONG.,
~ ~ 2~ SESS.,GENERAL
EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE
ACTOF 1978, at 225 (Comm. Print 1979).
A bill has been introduced in the House that would delay the effective date until 1982.
H.R. 5505, § 12(e),96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.REC.H9899, H9901 (daily ed.Oct. 30,
1979).
7. Pollock v. Farmer's LOAN& TRUST
CO., 157 U.S. 429, rehearing, 158 U S . 601
(1895). "That decision is only one of many that make constitutional law an easy route to
THE IDEOLOGIES
OF
an enviable reputation for critical scholarship." L. EISENSTEIN,
TAXATION
18 (1961).
8. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 8 38, 36 Stat. 112 (repealed 1913).
9. See, e.g., Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U S . 397, 412-13 (1904).
10. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
11. Id. at 151-52.
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Now that the sixteenth amendment has buried the apportionment bugaboo as to levies on income, we openly call the section Ill2corporate exaction an income tax. However, consideration of the tax's incidence and the implications thereof gives substantial cause for concluding that Congress was closer to the truth
in 1909 when it used the title "special excise tax."
The question of who ultimately bears the corporate income
tax remains frustratingly resistant to a precise answer; but this
much is clear-the tax is not borne by those legal entities called
corporations. Its burden rests on some or all of the following in
unknown proportions: investors through a lower rate of return,
employees through lower compensation, and consumers through
higher prices for goods and services.13
The foregoing points are significant because an income tax
is ordinarily conceived of as a system for defining the taxable
income of the taxpayers and imposing a set of rates, usually rates
that rise as taxpayer income increases. The minimum objective,
often missed, is to tax equal amounts of income equally. The
section 11 corporate tax does not fit within this conception of an
income tax. Since the incidence of the corporate tax cannot be
determined with any precision, its progressive rates" cannot be
correlated with the income levels of the ultimate payors. Even if
it could be established that the corporate level tax was borne
entirely by shareholders, it seems impossible to construct such a
tax with generally applicable progressive rates that would correspond with the varying income levels of individual shareholders.
And even if the tax were imposed as a single rate levy, with the
individual income tax following the same pattern, our uncertainty over the extent to which the corporate tax was ultimately
being borne by incomes below the exemption levels of the individual income tax would prevent assurance that the section 11 tax
conformed to ability-to-pay notions. l5
12. I.R.C. 9 11.
FEDERAL
TAXPOLICY
106, 111-15 (rev. ed. 1971); U.S. DEP'TOF THE
13. J. PECHMAN,
TREASURY,
BLUEPRINTS
FOR BASICTAXREFORM
4 (1977); Klein, The Incidence Of The
Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View Of A Problem In Economics, 1965 WIS.L. REV.
576.
14. The § 11 tax now has five graduated rate brackets.
AND TAXREFORM:
1961-1969, at 662 (W. Helmuth & 0 . Oldman eds.
15. TAXPOLICY
1973) (testimony of Stanley S. Surrey to the Committee on Ways and Means); U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, supra note 13,'at 68; Goode, Corporation Income Tax Rates, in STAW
OF HOUSE
COMM.
ON WAYS
AND MEANS,
TAXREVISIONCOMPENDIUM
2281,2285 (Comm. Print
1959); McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Tax: The Missing
Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV.L. REV.532, 539 (1975).
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The corporate tax is simply not an income tax in the same
sense as the section 116individual income tax. The corporate tax
has been blended into the income tax portions of the Internal
Revenue Code; but that is the result of historical drafting decisions, not the result of the nature of the levy. The corporate
-income tax is what it was originally styled in 1909-an excise on
doing business in corporate form."

111. WHATIS THE NATURE
OF THE NOL CARRYOVER
IN THE CORPORATE
INCOME
TAX?
The section 17218NOL mechanism is commonly considered
an averaging device for mitigating discrimination between taxpayers with both positive and negative income years in a given
time period and taxpayers who have the same net income as the
former group over the same time period but who receive it in level
amounts without loss years.lg The following is a representative
statement of this view:
[Llosses incurred in business now can be carried back20to the
three years preceding the loss year, and then forward for the
seven succeeding years, as a deduction from the positive income
of each of those prior or subsequent periods. In effect, an elevenyear span is covered if one includes the loss year itself. Companies which experience fluctuating profits and losses-say 'a $500
net operating loss in Year 1followed by $1,000 of profit in Year
2-are thus treated the same in overall terms as companies with
a flat income stream, that is, with $250 of profit in both years.
Since interperiod loss-offsets are important to an equitable tax
system, most would agree that the averaging period should be
limited only by considerations of administrative fea~ibility.~'

This quotation accurately describes the effect of section 172
on individuals. In the individual income tax, section 172 directly
16. I.R.C. 8 1.
17. For an econometric study reaching the same conclusion, see Harberger, The Corporation Income Tax: An Empirical Appraisal, in STAFF OF HOUSECOMM.ON WAYSAND
MEANS,TAXREVISION
COMPENDIUM
231, 232, 239 (Comm. Print 1959).
18. I.R.C. § 172.
19. See, e.g., Treasury Department Report on "Business Loss Offsets" (Oct. 1947),
W. WARREN,
P. MCDANIEL
& H. AULT,FEDERAL
INCOME
TAXATION
769,770
in 1 S. SURREY,
(1972).
20. This Article does not discuss the carryback feature of 8 172 because NOL carrybacks are not § 381(c) items. For a proposal as to the survivability of NOL carrybacks,
see Metzer, An Effective Use of Plain English-The Evolution and Impact of Section
'
368(a)(l)(F), 32 TAXLAW. 703, 740-44 (1979).
21. M. CHIRELSTEIN,
FEDERAL
INCOME
TAXATSON
199-200 (2d. ed. 1979).

'
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mitigates discrimination between taxpayers with level incomes
and taxpayers with both gain and loss years by averaging the
incomes of the latter group. Since the section 1 tax on the business incomes of individuals is borne by them and not shifted to
others,22the taxpayers who directly benefit from section 172 in the
individual income tax are those who suffered loss and who then
would have had to pay higher taxes in the carryforward years but
for section 172.
Matters are significantly different with respect to the section
11 tax. Section 172 also averages income in the corporate income
tax, but only at the corporate level. The effects must then filter
through the corporation to the ultimate payors of the section 11
tax. But because these ultimate payors may be changing daily,
with the result that many who are investors, employees, or customers of a given corporation at the end of the carryforward period may not have been such at the time of loss or beginning of
the carryforward period, the primary role of section 172 in the
corporate tax cannot be averaging the incomes of the ultimate
payors .23
--

-

22. R. GOODE,
THEINDIVIDUAL
INCOME
TAX60 (rev. ed. 1976);J. PECHMAN
& B. OKNER,
THE TAXBURDEN?
25, 30, 37 (1974).
WHOBEARS
23. For this reason, conclusions herein are not based on an assertion that a corporate
NOL carryover is an asset which "belongs" directly to any particular group of ultimate
payors of the Q 11 tax. See note 25 infra. This raises the question of whether 4 172 should
be applicable to the Q 11tax at all. Analysis of the issue from the standpoint of shareholders cuts both ways.
For some shareholders, the corporate tax may produce increased burdens on corporate
equity investment income, thus resulting in discrimination against the conduct of busisupra
ness in corporate form and in other related e~onomicdistortions. See J. PECHMAN,
note 13, at 120-21; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
supra note 13, a t 68-69. Since 4 172
mitigates these inequities and distortions by lowering the burden of the § 11 tax, this
analysis indicates that Q 172 should continue to be applicable to the corporate tax.
However, the § 11 tax confers a 46% maximum rate plus the opportunity to realize
corporate earnings on a deferred basis at the shareholder level in the form of increased
stock values taxed as capital gain. For some shareholders, this combination results in
corporate investment income being taxed more lightly than other investment income. See
McLure, supra note 15, a t 537-42. As to these shareholders, the corporate income tax
creates discrimination in favor of the corporate form and may produce related economic
distortions. Since Q 172 has the effect of lowering the 6 11 tax burden, it exacerbates the
discrimination in this case and increases any accompanying economic distortions. Elimination of Q 172 from the corporate income tax is thus indicated under this line of argument.
This Article assumes that in spite of the foregoing conflict, Q 172 will continue to be
part of the 5 11 tax. There seems to be no serious pressure to the contrary.
The presence of Q 172 in the Q 11 tax has been rationalized as a needed subsidy to
business. See, e.g., H.R. REP.NO. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-2 C.B. 504,
510-11. This approach, however, involves the complicated questions of whether corporate
business should have a subsidy and of the relative advantages and disadvantages of tax
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Having decided what the primary role of the corporate NOL
carryover is not, we must now determine what it is. That matter
can best be resolved by examining the principal effect of NOL
carryovers in the corporate income tax. A corporation's carryover
accomplishes a reduction in the corporation's section 11 tax for
future years.24It has the effect of a corporate level excise tax
prepayment which can be recouped from the tax liability of later
periods. Viewed in this manner, a corporate NOL carryover is a
prepaid business expense that, for purposes of determining the
extent to which it survives a transfer of the corporation's assets
or stock, should be analyzed like a corporate prepayment of utility bills or other current business costs.

IV. A RATIONALE
FOR SECTION
382
Assume X Corporation carries on its books a prepayment of
its electricity bill and an unused NOL carryover. If X is sold to a
third party, whether the sale is taxable or tax free or whether the
sale is a stock or asset transaction, the consideration should be
adjusted upward to reflect the electricity prepayment. This item
is clearly a corporate asset for which the shareholders would
rightly expect c o m p e n ~ a t i o n Should
.~~
the NOL carryover be
treated any differently once it is seen to be primarily a prepaid
corporate excise tax?26Shouldn't it be freely transferable like
other corporate assets without running the gauntlet of section
382?
expenditures-matters far beyond the scope of this Article. See Surrey, Tax incentives as
a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HAW.L. REV.705 (1970).
24. Since the carryover is a deduction, the amount of tax reduction is less than the
amount of the carryover and will depend upon the corporation's marginal rate for each
carryover year.
25. The fact that the purchaser would not be able to deduct for income tax purposes
the portion of the purchase price allocable to the prepayment or that there night be tax
accounting problems with respect to the prepayment a t the corporate level is irrelevant.
The relevant considerations are that the prepayment will offset future electricity charges
to the economic benefit of the purchaser and that the purchaser will be expected to pay
the shareholders for this benefit because they control it.
26. Granted, the superficial issue here is whether the corporate NOL carryover should
survive the transaction and continue to be deductible for the economic benefit of the
purchaser. But the real issue is whether X Corporation's shareholders can get compensated for this prepaid expense item. The only way in which the benefit of the corporate
NOL carryover can be realized as a prepayment of excise tax is through deducting the
NOL from the 5 11excise tax base in future years. Thus, the purchaser will not be willing
to compensate the X shareholders for this item unless assured of continued deductibility.
Therefore, the question of deductibility after purchase is really a question of whether the
shareholders will be allowed to sell the asset as part of the purchase transaction.
Note that this Article is not arguing that a corporate NOL carryover should be
transferable other than in connection with a preservation transaction as described in the
text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
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Various reasons have been advanced for answering this last
question negatively. One commentator recently stated that the
"major flaw" in suggesting that corporate NOL carryovers should
be freely transferable "is that it totally distorts the purpose of the
loss carryover provision," which, the commentator asserts, "was
designed to average out the profits and losses of the taxpayer and
not those of different taxpayer^."^^ However, as noted above, section 172 does not play the direct income averaging role for the
ultimate payors of the section 11tax that it plays for the individual income taxpayer. Since the corporate NOL carryover has only
an indirect and often negligible averaging effect on those who
bear the corporate income tax, it seems better to characterize it
according to its primary effect-a prepayment of a corporate excise tax.
It has also been suggested that the folly of free trade in corporate NOL carryovers would become more apparent if the matter
were analyzed in terms of direct government subsidies. This argument has been made as follows:
It may be observed that the whole question of the transferability of losses arises because of the mechanism used to give
some tax recognition to net losses in the usual situation. If, for
example, a subsidy payment had been the mechanism chosen,
so that a direct government payment in the year of loss were
made, no issue of transferability of loss carryovers would arise
. . . . If outsiders would not benefit in . . . [this situation],
should they be allowed to benefit under the loss carryforward
mechani~rn?~~

The central premise of the foregoing suggestion is that " [i]f . . .
a subsidy payment had been the mechanism chosen, so that a
direct government payment in the year of loss were made, no
issue of transferability of loss carryovers would arise." This statement is presumably an assertion that no one would think of permitting the loss corporation to anticipate receipt of its subsidy
check by selling its subsidy claim to a third party for cash in
advance. But is that so? If corporate management determines
that present cash is worth more than a future subsidy check,
there seems nothing wrong with allowing the corporation to re27. Salem, Limitations on NOL, ITC and Other Carryovers: A Suggested Reform of
the 1976 Reform, 36 N.Y.U. TAXINST.815, 824 (1978).
28. AMERICAN
LAWINSTITUTE,FEDERAL
INCOME,ESTATEAND GIFT TAX STATOF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS-REPORT
FOR 1957-58, at
UTE-INCOME
TAXPROBLEMS
47 (1958).
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ceive its subsidy through a present discounted sale rather than
waiting for the Treasury's draft.2Unalysis of the corporate NOL
carryover in subsidy terms seems only to strengthen the free trade
argument .30
It has been also asserted that since we would be intuitively
outraged if individuals were allowed to sell deduction carryovers,
we should be equally offended at the thought of corporations
transferring NOL carry over^.^^ That assertion involves a non sequitur. To the extent deduction carryovers are incorporated in the
individual income tax to produce a more equitable income definition for the taxpayers generating the deductions, they should not
be transferable to other taxpayers. To permit transfer would defeat the purpose of the carryover. But for reasons given above,32
the corporate NOL carryover's primary purpose cannot be to produce a more equitable definition of the incomes of those who
ultimately bear the tax. Thus, the fact that income-defining carryovers in the individual income tax should be nontransferable
does not require nontransferability of the corporate NOL carryover. Moreover, to the extent that a deduction carryover is
granted for subsidy purposes in the individual income tax, analysis in the preceding paragraph indicates that it would not be
outrageous to allow individuals to sell such a carryover.
Another attack is based on the assertion that free trade
would give corporate NOL carryover buyers an unacceptable
windfall since the price paid will usually be a fraction of the
carryover's worth. The following is a prominent statement of this
view:
[Flree traffic in loss offsets would mean large windfalls for
buyers. Thus, in situations where today a net loss can legally be
29. Granted, such a sale may be illegal under present law. See 31 U.S.C. 4 203 (1976);
Korbel, The Anti-Assignment Statute in the Tax Field: A Trap for the Unwary Practitioner, 18 TAXL. REV. 473 (1963). However, Congress can easily remove this obstacle
with an appropriate amendment. Furthermore, 6 203 is based on considerations of administrative convenience and prevention of fraud. Patterson v. United States, 354 F.2d 327,
329 (Ct. C1. 1965). Thus, it is irrelevant to the issue of whether free transferability of NOL
carryovers represents sound tax policy.
30. This analysis also argxes for repeal of the limitation on certain subsidy carryovers
contained in I.R.C. 6 383.
31. "If one taxpayer who had medical expenses which he could not deduct were to
transfer those deductions, for a price, to another taxpayer who could take advantage of'
them on his income tax return, it would be a shocking thing. In principle, trafficking in
net operating losses is no different." Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 106'12
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3286 (1976) (statement of
Michael Waris, Jr.).
32. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
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obtained on the purchase of a corporation, according to the observations of some practitioners loss positions have been acquired for 10 to 15 cents on the dollar or less. A considerable
windfall is thus present, since one dollar paid may bring up to
five dollars of tax benefit. Even if restrictions were removed,
buyers would still be able to purchase the losses at considerable
discounts because of the weak bargaining positions of the sellers
and the general business risks faced by buyers. The basic concern, in this light, would be that of cutting down on the ability
of buyers to obtain these tax windfalls, rather than that of furnishing tax relief to sellers.33

There is a strong probability, however, that the low price for
carryovers results from the presence of sections 26934and 382.
These sections do not create total nontransferability but do produce considerable d h b t as to whether a given buyer will get full
use of an NOL carryover. In that situation it is perfectly reasonable to find buyers paying heavily discounted prices.35The inevitable result is that buyers who successfully penetrate sections 269
and 382 reap substantial windfalls. If our concern is to mitigate
this windfall feature, making section 382 more rigorous is not the
indisputable answer. A perfectly rational course would be to
make NOL carryovers freely transferable and thus remove the
discount arising from uncertainty. The extent to which buyers
would still be able to command discounts because of distress
33. ALI PROJECT,
supra note 3, a t 341-42.
34. I.R.C. § 269(a) provides:
(a) IN GENERAL.-If(1)any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October
8, 1940, directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or
(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8,
1940, directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not controlled, directly or indirectly, immediately before such acquisition, by
such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis of which property, in the hands of the acquiring corporation, is determined by reference to the basis in the hands of transferor corporation,
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or
avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit,
or other allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy,
then the Secretary may disallow such deduction, credit, or other allowance. For
purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), control means the ownership of stock possessing a t least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote or a t least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all
classes of stock of the corporation.
supra note 3, a t 339; Aidinoff, Utilization of Acquired Net Operat35. ALI PROJECT,
ing Loss Carryovers and the Tax Reform Act of 1976-A Face-Lift for Section 382, 55
TAXES
874, 887 (1977).
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positions of sellers under this alternative would result from the
business reality that distress sales of any item usually bring a
lower price unless there is a free and active market to minimize
the distress element.36
The only compelling argument against free trade in corporate
NOL carryovers is one of practical politics. If the national conscience is not offended by free trade in utility prepayments, it
ought not to be outraged by trafficking in corporate NOL carryover~.~'
However, public attitudes are matters of fact, not reason;
and there is considerable evidence that Americans view corporate
NOL carryovers as being different from utility prepayments regardless of whether to do so is rational. This point has been stated
as follows:
[Tlhis view of freedom to sell loss offsets . . . does appear to
many as partaking of tax immorality. It would be difficult to
rationalize as a bona fide and regular part of the business world
the acceptance of the methodical purchase and sale of corporate
shells because of their loss offsets . . . .38

Thus it appears necessary to limit the transferability of corporate
NOL carryovers in order to foster within the public the feelings
of confidence and goodwill essential to sustaining a selfassessment income tax system.39
This observation leads to troubling conclusion for those en36. This is as good a place as any to state that restrictions on transfers of corporate
NOL canyovers have been advocated as inhibitors of undesirable economic concentration.
ALI PROJECT,supra note 3, a t 342. But there is an effective rebuttal to this argument:
[I]t seems unlikely that a revenue act can be adequately selective by its terms
to encourage the reorganizations which will result in growth, and to discourage
those which will have monopolistic or other economically unfortunate tendencies . . . . [I]t would seem better to obtain enforcement of the antitrust and
related statutes by reliance upon those agencies of Government which are responsible in that area and which presumably can make intelligent differentiation between transactions according to standards relevant to the statutes they
are charged with administering and enforcing.
Brown, An Approach to Subschapter C, in STAFFOF HOUSECOMM.ON WAYSAND MEANS,
TAXREVISION
COMPENDIUM
1619, 1622 (Comm. Print 1959).
37. The foregoing analysis also indicates that the principal purpose for which a business combination was effected should have no bearing on the survivability of an NOL
carryover (except to the extent preservation depends on the combination transaction being
treated as a tax-free reorganization so that the business purpose requirement is applicable,
(Treas. Reg. 6 1.368-1(c) (1955)) and that $269 should be inapplicable to the preservation
issue.
38. ALI PROJECT,supra note 3, a t 341.
39. An alternative would be an attempt by the business community to create a
favorable public attitude concerning free trade in corporate NOL carryovers. The chance
of success seems slim.
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amored with logical solutions.40It suggests that all attempts to
produce a section 382 flowing harmoniously from the structure
and assumptions of the income tax or embodying some external
standard derived from reason as to when corporate NOL carryovers should be transferable are fruitless. There is nothing inherent in the nature of the section 11 tax or in logic which requires
limitations on the transferability of corporate NOL carryovers.
The "reform" of section 382 is a sociopolitical problem. The limitations on survivability of NOL carryovers lack a firm basis in
logic. They have been imposed because of the political demands
of noncorporate taxpayers. This suggests that the objective or
rationale of any section 382 revision must be the creation of limitations that go far enough to satisfy the great body of "ordinary"
taxpayers while doing as little damage as possible to the orderly
progress of commerce.41

The 1976 Tax Reform Act (TRA) version of section 382 fails
this standard. It increases the difficulty of transferring corporate
NOL carryovers and the complexity and uncertainty of the law
without any hard evidence of public demand for change.42A move
in the direction of pre-1976 law would be a p ~ r o p r i a t e . ~ ~
Congress should not totally return to the pre-1976 version of
section 382, however. For instance, the business continuation
ruled4of old section 382(a) had the potential for inhibiting the
purchasers of a failing business from restructuring it.45Elimination of this rule by the 1976 TRA was sound. But since removal
of the business continuation rule makes the law more stringent
when increased rigor is not desired, some mitigating tradeoff is
needed. An appropriate solution would be to change the 50% rule
of old section 382(a) to an 80%rule, while returning to the old 20%
-

40. It also irritates lawyers and academicians by diminishing the importance of their
expertise.
41. This suggestion that the proper structure of # 382 is a political question is not a
radical view. Questions as fundamental to our income tax system as whether it should be
.progressive and how progressive should it be are matters which can be ultimately resolved
THEIDEOLOGIES
OF TAXATION
only by reference to the political process. See L. EISENSTEIN,
33 (1961).
42. See Aidinoff, supra note 35, at 886-87; Salem, supra note 27, at 81'5, 819.
43. Since there was never any significant evidence of public concern regarding I.R.C.
$ 383 carryover items, that provision, which applies # 382 restrictions to certain corporate
tax credits, foreign taxes, and capital losses, could well be abolished.
44. See note 4 supra.
45. ALI PROJECT,
supra note 3, a t 339; Salem, supra note 27, at 825-26.
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rule in the case of section 382(b).46This would balance the loss of
the advantages of the business continuation rule of section 382(a),
move back towards the principal features of the pre-1976 law, and
create consistency between the percentage tests of sections 382(a)
and (b).
The old section 382(a) was also objectionable in that a minute encroachment on its percentage test could result in the complete loss of the NOL carryover. The graduated "scale down"
concept of the new section 382(a)(2) is an improvement that
should be retained.
The new section 382 removes Libson Shops, Inc. v. KoehlerJ7
from the law applicable to corporate NOL carry over^.^^ Internal
Revenue Service concessions had left Libson Shops with only
limited viability anyway,49and eradication of the remainder of its
uncertain reach will add something to the law's certainty") without a major change in coverage. This feature of the 1976 TRA
should be retained.
Finally, the legislative history of the new section 382 reduces
the influence of section 269 on transferability of corporate NOL
carryovers but does so in language that makes the extent of the
reduction ~ n c e r t a i n . ~Although
'
its potency has increased in re-

-

p
-

46. As originally passed, 8 382(b) "was applicable only to changes of ownership
through a tax-free reorganization, under which the carryover [was] reduced proportionately if the old owners receive[d] less than 20 percent of the stock of the reorganized
& J. EUSTICE,
supra
corporation and [was] eliminated if they received none." B. BITTKER
note 2, 7 16.22, at 16-54. The 1976 TRA increased the 20% figure to 40%. Id. 8 16.24, a t
16-74.
47. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).In Libson Shops 16 separately incorporated retail stores were
merged into a single corporation. Three of the premerger corporations had NOL carryovers
which the postmerger corporation wished to offset against its postmerger profits. The
retail activities of the three corporations which had generated the NOL carryovers continued to be unprofitable after the merger. Consequently, the only postmerger income from
which the carryovers could be deducted was that produced by the 13 profitable operations.
The Supreme Court concluded that "petitioner is not entitled to a carry-over since the
income against which the offset is claimed was not produced by substantially the same
businesses which incurred the losses." Id. at 390. The meaning and reach of this decision
supra note
have never been adequately clarified. See generally B. B ~ K E&RJ. EUSTICE,
2, 7 16.26.
ON TAXATION,
94TH CONG.,2~ SESS.,GENERAL
EXPLANATION
48. STAFFOF JOINTCOMM.
OF THE TAXREFORM
ACT OF 1976, at 202 (Comm. Print 1976).
49. See Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 C.B. 46; Rev. Rul. 58-603,1958-2 C.B. 147; IRS Tech.
Info. Release No. 773 (Oct. 13, 1965).
& J. EUSTICE,
supra note 2, 11 16.26, a t 16-94 to -95.
50. See B. BITTKER
51. S. REP. NO. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 206, reprinted in [I9761 U.S. CODECONG.
& AD. NEWS3439, 3638:
The Committee has not amended section 269 of present law because the
application of this general disallowance provision should be retained for transac-
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cent years, section 269 has historically not been a major weapon
against transfers of corporate NOL carry over^.^^ Nevertheless, it
adds an element of unpredictability to tax planning for corporate
acquisition transactions. If Congress excised the remainder of section 269 from this area, it would make the law more certain without removing a major historical barrier.
The political rationale suggested earlier for section 382 can
certainly be served by statutory configurations different from the
one given above. However, a return to old section 382 with the
foregoing modifications would satisfy the political rationale while
resulting in a provision with contours similar to those which taxpayers and practitioners have learned to live with since 1954.
tions not expressly within the fixed rules as changed by the amendment. Section
269 is retained, for example, to deal with "built-in loss" transactions and other
exchanges or transfers which are apparent devices to exploit continuing gaps in
the technical rules for tax avoidance purposes. The committee believes, however, that section 269 should not be applied to disallow net operating loss carryovers in situations where part or all of a loss carryover is permitted under the
specific rules in section 382, unless a device or scheme to circumvent the purpose
of the carryover restrictions appears to be present.
52. ALI PROJECT,supm note 3, at 345; B.
& J. E u s n c ~supra
,
note 2, I/ 16.21,
at 16-45 to -46, 116.22, at 16-53.
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